Developing with GSSAPI
======================

The GSSAPI (Generic Security Services API) allows applications to
communicate securely using Kerberos 5 or other security mechanisms.
We recommend using the GSSAPI (or a higher-level framework which
encompasses GSSAPI, such as SASL) for secure network communication
over using the libkrb5 API directly.

GSSAPIv2 is specified in :rfc:`2743` and :rfc:`2744`.  Also see
:rfc:`7546` for a description of how to use the GSSAPI in a client or
server program.

This documentation will describe how various ways of using the
GSSAPI will behave with the krb5 mechanism as implemented in MIT krb5,
as well as krb5-specific extensions to the GSSAPI.


Name types
----------

A GSSAPI application can name a local or remote entity by calling
gss_import_name_, specifying a name type and a value.  The following
name types are supported by the krb5 mechanism:

* **GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE**: The value should be a string of the
  form ``service`` or ``service@hostname``.  This is the most common
  way to name target services when initiating a security context, and
  is the most likely name type to work across multiple mechanisms.

* **GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME**: The value should be a principal name
  string.  This name type only works with the krb5 mechanism, and is
  defined in the ``<gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>`` header.

* **GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME** or **GSS_C_NULL_OID**: The value is treated
  as an unparsed principal name string, as above.  These name types
  may work with mechanisms other than krb5, but will have different
  interpretations in those mechanisms.  **GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME** is
  intended to be used with a local username, which will parse into a
  single-component principal in the default realm.

* **GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS**: The value is ignored.  The anonymous
  principal is used, allowing a client to authenticate to a server
  without asserting a particular identity (which may or may not be
  allowed by a particular server or Kerberos realm).

* **GSS_C_NT_MACHINE_UID_NAME**: The value is uid_t object.  On
  Unix-like systems, the username of the uid is looked up in the
  system user database and the resulting username is parsed as a
  principal name.

* **GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME**: As above, but the value is a decimal
  string representation of the uid.

* **GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME**: The value must be the result of a
  gss_export_name_ call.

* **GSS_KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_NAME**: The value should be a krb5
  enterprise name string (see :rfc:`6806` section 5), in the form
  ``user@suffix``.  This name type is used to convey alias names, and
  is defined in the ``<gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>`` header.  (New in
  release 1.17.)


Initiator credentials
---------------------

A GSSAPI client application uses gss_init_sec_context_ to establish a
security context.  The *initiator_cred_handle* parameter determines
what tickets are used to establish the connection.  An application can
either pass **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** to use the default client
credential, or it can use gss_acquire_cred_ beforehand to acquire an
initiator credential.  The call to gss_acquire_cred_ may include a
*desired_name* parameter, or it may pass **GSS_C_NO_NAME** if it does
not have a specific name preference.

If the desired name for a krb5 initiator credential is a host-based
name, it is converted to a principal name of the form
``service/hostname`` in the local realm, where *hostname* is the local
hostname if not specified.  The hostname will be canonicalized using
forward name resolution, and possibly also using reverse name
resolution depending on the value of the **rdns** variable in
:ref:`libdefaults`.

If a desired name is specified in the call to gss_acquire_cred_, the
krb5 mechanism will attempt to find existing tickets for that client
principal name in the default credential cache or collection.  If the
default cache type does not support a collection, and the default
cache contains credentials for a different principal than the desired
name, a **GSS_S_CRED_UNAVAIL** error will be returned with a minor
code indicating a mismatch.

If no existing tickets are available for the desired name, but the
name has an entry in the default client :ref:`keytab_definition`, the
krb5 mechanism will acquire initial tickets for the name using the
default client keytab.

If no desired name is specified, credential acquisition will be
deferred until the credential is used in a call to
gss_init_sec_context_ or gss_inquire_cred_.  If the call is to
gss_init_sec_context_, the target name will be used to choose a client
principal name using the credential cache selection facility.  (This
facility might, for instance, try to choose existing tickets for a
client principal in the same realm as the target service).  If there
are no existing tickets for the chosen principal, but it is present in
the default client keytab, the krb5 mechanism will acquire initial
tickets using the keytab.

If the target name cannot be used to select a client principal
(because the credentials are used in a call to gss_inquire_cred_), or
if the credential cache selection facility cannot choose a principal
for it, the default credential cache will be selected if it exists and
contains tickets.

If the default credential cache does not exist, but the default client
keytab does, the krb5 mechanism will try to acquire initial tickets
for the first principal in the default client keytab.

If the krb5 mechanism acquires initial tickets using the default
client keytab, the resulting tickets will be stored in the default
cache or collection, and will be refreshed by future calls to
gss_acquire_cred_ as they approach their expire time.


Acceptor names
--------------

A GSSAPI server application uses gss_accept_sec_context_ to establish
a security context based on tokens provided by the client.  The
*acceptor_cred_handle* parameter determines what
:ref:`keytab_definition` entries may be authenticated to by the
client, if the krb5 mechanism is used.

The simplest choice is to pass **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** as the acceptor
credential.  In this case, clients may authenticate to any service
principal in the default keytab (typically |keytab|, or the value of
the **KRB5_KTNAME** environment variable).  This is the recommended
approach if the server application has no specific requirements to the
contrary.

A server may acquire an acceptor credential with gss_acquire_cred_ and
a *cred_usage* of **GSS_C_ACCEPT** or **GSS_C_BOTH**.  If the
*desired_name* parameter is **GSS_C_NO_NAME**, then clients will be
allowed to authenticate to any service principal in the default
keytab, just as if no acceptor credential was supplied.

If a server wishes to specify a *desired_name* to gss_acquire_cred_,
the most common choice is a host-based name.  If the host-based
*desired_name* contains just a *service*, then clients will be allowed
to authenticate to any host-based service principal (that is, a
principal of the form ``service/hostname@REALM``) for the named
service, regardless of hostname or realm, as long as it is present in
the default keytab.  If the input name contains both a *service* and a
*hostname*, clients will be allowed to authenticate to any host-based
principal for the named service and hostname, regardless of realm.

.. note::

          If a *hostname* is specified, it will be canonicalized
          using forward name resolution, and possibly also using
          reverse name resolution depending on the value of the
          **rdns** variable in :ref:`libdefaults`.

.. note::

          If the **ignore_acceptor_hostname** variable in
          :ref:`libdefaults` is enabled, then *hostname* will be
          ignored even if one is specified in the input name.

.. note::

          In MIT krb5 versions prior to 1.10, and in Heimdal's
          implementation of the krb5 mechanism, an input name with
          just a *service* is treated like an input name of
          ``service@localhostname``, where *localhostname* is the
          string returned by gethostname().

If the *desired_name* is a krb5 principal name or a local system name
type which is mapped to a krb5 principal name, clients will only be
allowed to authenticate to that principal in the default keytab.


Name Attributes
---------------

In release 1.8 or later, the gss_inquire_name_ and
gss_get_name_attribute_ functions, specified in :rfc:`6680`, can be
used to retrieve name attributes from the *src_name* returned by
gss_accept_sec_context_.  The following attributes are defined when
the krb5 mechanism is used:

.. _gssapi_authind_attr:

* "auth-indicators" attribute:

This attribute will be included in the gss_inquire_name_ output if the
ticket contains :ref:`authentication indicators <auth_indicator>`.
One indicator is returned per invocation of gss_get_name_attribute_,
so multiple invocations may be necessary to retrieve all of the
indicators from the ticket.  (New in release 1.15.)


Importing and exporting credentials
-----------------------------------

The following GSSAPI extensions can be used to import and export
credentials (declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``)::

    OM_uint32 gss_export_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                              gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
                              gss_buffer_t token);

    OM_uint32 gss_import_cred(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                              gss_buffer_t token,
                              gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle);

The first function serializes a GSSAPI credential handle into a
buffer; the second unseralizes a buffer into a GSSAPI credential
handle.  Serializing a credential does not destroy it.  If any of the
mechanisms used in *cred_handle* do not support serialization,
gss_export_cred will return **GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE**.  As with other
GSSAPI serialization functions, these extensions are only intended to
work with a matching implementation on the other side; they do not
serialize credentials in a standardized format.

A serialized credential may contain secret information such as ticket
session keys.  The serialization format does not protect this
information from eavesdropping or tampering.  The calling application
must take care to protect the serialized credential when communicating
it over an insecure channel or to an untrusted party.

A krb5 GSSAPI credential may contain references to a credential cache,
a client keytab, an acceptor keytab, and a replay cache.  These
resources are normally serialized as references to their external
locations (such as the filename of the credential cache).  Because of
this, a serialized krb5 credential can only be imported by a process
with similar privileges to the exporter.  A serialized credential
should not be trusted if it originates from a source with lower
privileges than the importer, as it may contain references to external
credential cache, keytab, or replay cache resources not accessible to
the originator.

An exception to the above rule applies when a krb5 GSSAPI credential
refers to a memory credential cache, as is normally the case for
delegated credentials received by gss_accept_sec_context_.  In this
case, the contents of the credential cache are serialized, so that the
resulting token may be imported even if the original memory credential
cache no longer exists.


Constrained delegation (S4U)
----------------------------

The Microsoft S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy Kerberos protocol extensions
allow an intermediate service to acquire credentials from a client to
a target service without requiring the client to delegate a
ticket-granting ticket, if the KDC is configured to allow it.

To perform a constrained delegation operation, the intermediate
service must submit to the KDC an "evidence ticket" from the client to
the intermediate service with the forwardable bit set.  An evidence
ticket can be acquired when the client authenticates to the
intermediate service with Kerberos, or with an S4U2Self request if the
KDC allows it.  The MIT krb5 GSSAPI library represents an evidence
ticket using a "proxy credential", which is a special kind of
gss_cred_id_t object whose underlying credential cache contains the
evidence ticket and a krbtgt ticket for the intermediate service.

To acquire a proxy credential during client authentication, the
service should first create an acceptor credential using the
**GSS_C_BOTH** usage.  The application should then pass this
credential as the *acceptor_cred_handle* to gss_accept_sec_context_,
and also pass a *delegated_cred_handle* output parameter to receive a
proxy credential containing the evidence ticket.  The output value of
*delegated_cred_handle* may be a delegated ticket-granting ticket if
the client sent one, or a proxy credential if the client authenticated
with a forwardable service ticket, or **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** if
neither is the case.

To acquire a proxy credential using an S4U2Self request, the service
can use the following GSSAPI extension::

    OM_uint32 gss_acquire_cred_impersonate_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                                gss_cred_id_t icred,
                                                gss_name_t desired_name,
                                                OM_uint32 time_req,
                                                gss_OID_set desired_mechs,
                                                gss_cred_usage_t cred_usage,
                                                gss_cred_id_t *output_cred,
                                                gss_OID_set *actual_mechs,
                                                OM_uint32 *time_rec);

The parameters to this function are similar to those of
gss_acquire_cred_, except that *icred* is used to make an S4U2Self
request to the KDC for a ticket from *desired_name* to the
intermediate service.  Both *icred* and *desired_name* are required
for this function; passing **GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL** or
**GSS_C_NO_NAME** will cause the call to fail.  *icred* must contain a
krbtgt ticket for the intermediate service.  If the KDC returns a
forwardable ticket, the result of this operation is a proxy
credential; if it is not forwardable, the result is a regular
credential for *desired_name*.

A recent KDC will usually allow any service to acquire a ticket from a
client to itself with an S4U2Self request, but the ticket will only be
forwardable if the service has a specific privilege.  In the MIT krb5
KDC, this privilege is determined by the **ok_to_auth_as_delegate**
bit on the intermediate service's principal entry, which can be
configured with :ref:`kadmin(1)`.

Once the intermediate service has a proxy credential, it can simply
pass it to gss_init_sec_context_ as the *initiator_cred_handle*
parameter, and the desired service as the *target_name* parameter.
The GSSAPI library will present the krbtgt ticket and evidence ticket
in the proxy credential to the KDC in an S4U2Proxy request; if the
intermediate service has the appropriate permissions, the KDC will
issue a ticket from the client to the target service.  The GSSAPI
library will then use this ticket to authenticate to the target
service.

If an application needs to find out whether a credential it holds is a
proxy credential and the name of the intermediate service, it can
query the credential with the **GSS_KRB5_GET_CRED_IMPERSONATOR** OID
(new in release 1.16, declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>``) using
the gss_inquire_cred_by_oid extension (declared in
``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``)::

    OM_uint32 gss_inquire_cred_by_oid(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                      const gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
                                      gss_OID desired_object,
                                      gss_buffer_set_t *data_set);

If the call succeeds and *cred_handle* is a proxy credential,
*data_set* will be set to a single-element buffer set containing the
unparsed principal name of the intermediate service.  If *cred_handle*
is not a proxy credential, *data_set* will be set to an empty buffer
set.  If the library does not support the query,
gss_inquire_cred_by_oid will return **GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE**.


AEAD message wrapping
---------------------

The following GSSAPI extensions (declared in
``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``) can be used to wrap and unwrap messages
with additional "associated data" which is integrity-checked but is
not included in the output buffer::

    OM_uint32 gss_wrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                            gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                            int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req,
                            gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
                            gss_buffer_t input_payload_buffer,
                            int *conf_state,
                            gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer);

    OM_uint32 gss_unwrap_aead(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                              gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                              gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
                              gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
                              gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer,
                              int *conf_state,
                              gss_qop_t *qop_state);

Wrap tokens created with gss_wrap_aead will successfully unwrap only
if the same *input_assoc_buffer* contents are presented to
gss_unwrap_aead.


IOV message wrapping
--------------------

The following extensions (declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``) can
be used for in-place encryption, fine-grained control over wrap token
layout, and for constructing wrap tokens compatible with Microsoft DCE
RPC::

    typedef struct gss_iov_buffer_desc_struct {
        OM_uint32 type;
        gss_buffer_desc buffer;
    } gss_iov_buffer_desc, *gss_iov_buffer_t;

    OM_uint32 gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                           gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                           int conf_req_flag, gss_qop_t qop_req,
                           int *conf_state,
                           gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);

    OM_uint32 gss_unwrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                             gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                             int *conf_state, gss_qop_t *qop_state,
                             gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov, int iov_count);

    OM_uint32 gss_wrap_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                  gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                  int conf_req_flag,
                                  gss_qop_t qop_req, int *conf_state,
                                  gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
                                  int iov_count);

    OM_uint32 gss_release_iov_buffer(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                     gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
                                     int iov_count);

The caller of gss_wrap_iov provides an array of gss_iov_buffer_desc
structures, each containing a type and a gss_buffer_desc structure.
Valid types include:

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA**: A data buffer to be included in the
  token, and to be encrypted or decrypted in-place if the token is
  confidentiality-protected.

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER**: The GSSAPI wrap token header and
  underlying cryptographic header.

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER**: The cryptographic trailer, if one is
  required.

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING**: Padding to be combined with the data
  during encryption and decryption.  (The implementation may choose to
  place padding in the trailer buffer, in which case it will set the
  padding buffer length to 0.)

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM**: For unwrapping only, a buffer
  containing a complete wrap token in standard format to be unwrapped.

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY**: A buffer to be included in the
  token's integrity protection checksum, but not to be encrypted or
  included in the token itself.

For gss_wrap_iov, the IOV list should contain one HEADER buffer,
followed by zero or more SIGN_ONLY buffers, followed by one or more
DATA buffers, followed by a TRAILER buffer.  The memory pointed to by
the buffers is not required to be contiguous or in any particular
order.  If *conf_req_flag* is true, DATA buffers will be encrypted
in-place, while SIGN_ONLY buffers will not be modified.

The type of an output buffer may be combined with
**GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE** to request that gss_wrap_iov allocate
the buffer contents.  If gss_wrap_iov allocates a buffer, it sets the
**GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATED** flag on the buffer type.
gss_release_iov_buffer can be used to release all allocated buffers
within an iov list and unset their allocated flags.  Here is an
example of how gss_wrap_iov can be used with allocation requested
(*ctx* is assumed to be a previously established gss_ctx_id_t)::

    OM_uint32 major, minor;
    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[4];
    char str[] = "message";

    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
    iov[1].buffer.value = str;
    iov[1].buffer.length = strlen(str);
    iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
    iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;

    major = gss_wrap_iov(&minor, ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, NULL,
                         iov, 4);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);

    /* Transmit or otherwise use resulting buffers. */

    (void)gss_release_iov_buffer(&minor, iov, 4);

If the caller does not choose to request buffer allocation by
gss_wrap_iov, it should first call gss_wrap_iov_length to query the
lengths of the HEADER, PADDING, and TRAILER buffers.  DATA buffers
must be provided in the iov list so that padding length can be
computed correctly, but the output buffers need not be initialized.
Here is an example of using gss_wrap_iov_length and gss_wrap_iov::

    OM_uint32 major, minor;
    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[4];
    char str[1024] = "message", *ptr;

    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
    iov[1].buffer.value = str;
    iov[1].buffer.length = strlen(str);

    iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_PADDING;
    iov[3].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;

    major = gss_wrap_iov_length(&minor, ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
                                NULL, iov, 4);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);
    if (strlen(str) + iov[0].buffer.length + iov[2].buffer.length +
        iov[3].buffer.length > sizeof(str))
        handle_out_of_space_error();
    ptr = str + strlen(str);
    iov[0].buffer.value = ptr;
    ptr += iov[0].buffer.length;
    iov[2].buffer.value = ptr;
    ptr += iov[2].buffer.length;
    iov[3].buffer.value = ptr;

    major = gss_wrap_iov(&minor, ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, NULL,
                         iov, 4);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);

If the context was established using the **GSS_C_DCE_STYLE** flag
(described in :rfc:`4757`), wrap tokens compatible with Microsoft DCE
RPC can be constructed.  In this case, the IOV list must include a
SIGN_ONLY buffer, a DATA buffer, a second SIGN_ONLY buffer, and a
HEADER buffer in that order (the order of the buffer contents remains
arbitrary).  The application must pad the DATA buffer to a multiple of
16 bytes as no padding or trailer buffer is used.

gss_unwrap_iov may be called with an IOV list just like one which
would be provided to gss_wrap_iov.  DATA buffers will be decrypted
in-place if they were encrypted, and SIGN_ONLY buffers will not be
modified.

Alternatively, gss_unwrap_iov may be called with a single STREAM
buffer, zero or more SIGN_ONLY buffers, and a single DATA buffer.  The
STREAM buffer is interpreted as a complete wrap token.  The STREAM
buffer will be modified in-place to decrypt its contents.  The DATA
buffer will be initialized to point to the decrypted data within the
STREAM buffer, unless it has the **GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE** flag
set, in which case it will be initialized with a copy of the decrypted
data.  Here is an example (*token* and *token_len* are assumed to be a
pre-existing pointer and length for a modifiable region of data)::

    OM_uint32 major, minor;
    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];

    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
    iov[0].buffer.value = token;
    iov[0].buffer.length = token_len;
    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
    major = gss_unwrap_iov(&minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, iov, 2);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);

    /* Decrypted data is in iov[1].buffer, pointing to a subregion of
     * token. */

.. _gssapi_mic_token:

IOV MIC tokens
--------------

The following extensions (declared in ``<gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>``) can
be used in release 1.12 or later to construct and verify MIC tokens
using an IOV list::

    OM_uint32 gss_get_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                              gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                              gss_qop_t qop_req,
                              gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
                              int iov_count);

    OM_uint32 gss_get_mic_iov_length(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                     gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                     gss_qop_t qop_req,
                                     gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
                                     iov_count);

    OM_uint32 gss_verify_mic_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
                                 gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
                                 gss_qop_t *qop_state,
                                 gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
                                 int iov_count);

The caller of gss_get_mic_iov provides an array of gss_iov_buffer_desc
structures, each containing a type and a gss_buffer_desc structure.
Valid types include:

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA** and **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY**: The
  corresponding buffer for each of these types will be signed for the
  MIC token, in the order provided.

* **GSS_C_BUFFER_TYPE_MIC_TOKEN**: The GSSAPI MIC token.

The type of the MIC_TOKEN buffer may be combined with
**GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE** to request that gss_get_mic_iov
allocate the buffer contents.  If gss_get_mic_iov allocates the
buffer, it sets the **GSS_C_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATED** flag on the buffer
type.  gss_release_iov_buffer can be used to release all allocated
buffers within an iov list and unset their allocated flags.  Here is
an example of how gss_get_mic_iov can be used with allocation
requested (*ctx* is assumed to be a previously established
gss_ctx_id_t)::

    OM_uint32 major, minor;
    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[3];

    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
    iov[0].buffer.value = "sign1";
    iov[0].buffer.length = 5;
    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_SIGN_ONLY;
    iov[1].buffer.value = "sign2";
    iov[1].buffer.length = 5;
    iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_MIC_TOKEN | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;

    major = gss_get_mic_iov(&minor, ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, iov, 3);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);

    /* Transmit or otherwise use iov[2].buffer. */

    (void)gss_release_iov_buffer(&minor, iov, 3);

If the caller does not choose to request buffer allocation by
gss_get_mic_iov, it should first call gss_get_mic_iov_length to query
the length of the MIC_TOKEN buffer.  Here is an example of using
gss_get_mic_iov_length and gss_get_mic_iov::

    OM_uint32 major, minor;
    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
    char data[1024];

    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_MIC_TOKEN;
    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
    iov[1].buffer.value = "message";
    iov[1].buffer.length = 7;

    major = gss_get_mic_iov_length(&minor, ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, iov, 2);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);
    if (iov[0].buffer.length > sizeof(data))
        handle_out_of_space_error();
    iov[0].buffer.value = data;

    major = gss_get_mic_iov(&minor, ctx, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, iov, 2);
    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
        handle_error(major, minor);


.. _gss_accept_sec_context: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.1
.. _gss_acquire_cred: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.2
.. _gss_export_name: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.13
.. _gss_get_name_attribute: https://tools.ietf.org/html/6680.html#section-7.5
.. _gss_import_name: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.16
.. _gss_init_sec_context: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.19
.. _gss_inquire_name: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6680.txt#section-7.4
.. _gss_inquire_cred: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2744.html#section-5.21
